                Design Considerations for Metadata Insertion

Abstract

   The IAB published RFC 7624 in response to several revelations of
   pervasive attacks on Internet communications. This document
   considers the implications of protocol designs that associate
   metadata with encrypted flows. In particular, it asserts that
   designs that share metadata only by explicit actions at the host are
   preferable to designs in which middleboxes insert metadata.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
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1. Introduction

   To minimize the risks associated with pervasive surveillance, it is
   necessary for the Internet technical community to address the
   vulnerabilities exploited in the attacks documented in [RFC7258] and
   the threats described in [RFC7624]. The goal of this document is to
   address a common design pattern that emerges from the increase in
   encryption: explicit association of metadata that would previously
   have been inferred from the plaintext protocol.

2. Terminology

   This document makes extensive use of standard security and privacy
   terminology; see [RFC4949] and [RFC6973]. Readers should be familiar
   with the terms defined in [RFC6973], including "Eavesdropper",
   "Observer", "Initiator", "Intermediary", "Recipient", "Attack" (in a
   privacy context), "Correlation", "Fingerprint", "Traffic Analysis",
   and "Identifiability" (and related terms). Readers should also be
   familiar with terms that are specific to the attacks discussed in
   [RFC7624], including "Pervasive Attack", "Passive Pervasive Attack",
   "Active Pervasive Attack", "Observation", "Inference", and
   "Collaborator".

3. Design Pattern

   One of the core mitigations for the loss of confidentiality in the
   presence of pervasive surveillance is data minimization, which limits
   the amount of data disclosed to those elements absolutely required to
   complete the relevant protocol exchange. When data minimization is
   in effect, some information that was previously available may be
   removed from specific protocol exchanges. The information may be
   removed explicitly (for example, by a browser suppressing cookies

during private modes) or by other means. As noted in [RFC7624], some
topologies that aggregate or alter the network path also act to
reduce the ease with which metadata is available to eavesdroppers.

In some cases, other actors within a protocol context will continue
to have access to the information that has been thus withdrawn from
specific protocol exchanges. If those actors attach the information
as metadata to those protocol exchanges, the confidentiality effect
of data minimization is lost.

Restoring information is particularly tempting at systems not
primarily deployed to increase confidentiality. A proxy providing
compression, for example, may wish to restore the identity of the
requesting party; similarly, a VPN system used to provide channel
security may believe that the origin IP should be restored. Actors
considering restoring metadata may believe that they understand the
relevant privacy considerations or believe that, because the primary
purpose of the service was not privacy-related, none exist. Examples
of this design pattern include [RFC7239] and [RFC7871].

4. Advice

Avoid inserting metadata to restore information that would otherwise
be unavailable to later participants in a protocol exchange. It
contributes to the overall loss of confidentiality for the Internet
and trust in the Internet as a medium. Do not add metadata to flows
at intermediary devices unless a positive affirmation of approval for
restoration has been received from the actor whose data will be
added.

Instead, design the protocol so that the actor can add such metadata
themselves so that it flows end to end, rather than requiring the
action of other parties. In addition to improving privacy, this
approach ensures consistent availability between the communicating
parties, no matter what path is taken. (Note that this document does
not attempt to describe how an actor sets policies on providing this
metadata, as the range of systems that might be implied is very
broad).

As an example, RFC 7871 describes a method that had already been
deployed and notes that it is unlikely that a clean-slate design
would result in this mechanism. If a clean-slate design were built
to follow the advice in this document, that design would likely not
use a core element of RFC 7871: rather than adding metadata at a
proxy, it would provide facilities for end systems to add it to their
initial queries. In the case of RFC 7871, the relevant metadata is
relatively easy for an end system to derive, as Session Traversal
Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] provides a method for learning the

reflexive transport address from which a client subnet could be
derived. This would allow clients to populate this data themselves,
thus affirming their consent and providing data at a granularity with
which they were comfortable. As in RFC 7871, the addition of this
data would require confirmation that the upstream DNS resolver
understands what to do with it, but the same negotiation mechanism,
an Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0)) option [RFC6891], could be
used. Because of this negotiation, there would be a new variability
in responses that would change the caching behavior for data supplied
by participating servers. This is not a major change from the
current design, however, as the same considerations set out in
Sections 7.3.2 and 7.5 of RFC 7871 would apply to client-supplied
subnets as well as to proxy-supplied subnets.

From a protocol perspective, in other words, this approach would be a
minor change from RFC 7871, would be as fully featured, and would
provide better privacy properties than the on-path update mechanism
RFC 7871 provides. The next section examines why, despite this,
deployment considerations have sometimes trumped cleaner designs.

5. Deployment Considerations

There are a few common tensions associated with the deployment of
systems that restore metadata. The first is the trade-off in speed
of deployment for different actors. The Forwarded HTTP Extension in
[RFC7239] provides an example of this. When used with a proxy, it
restores information related to the original requesting party, thus
allowing a responding server to tailor responses according to the
original party's region, network, or other characteristics associated
with the identity. It would, of course, be possible for the
originating client to add this data itself, after using STUN
[RFC5389] or a similar mechanism to first determine the information
to declare. This would require, however, full specification and
adoption of this mechanism by the end systems. It would not be
available at all during this period and would thereafter be limited
to systems that have been upgraded to include it. The long tail of
browser deployments indicates that many systems might go without
upgrades for a significant period of time. The proxy infrastructure,
in contrast, is commonly under more active management and represents
a much smaller number of elements; this impacts both the general
deployment difficulty and the number of systems that the origin
server must trust.

The second common tension is between metadata minimization and the
desire to tailor content responses. For origin servers whose content
is common across users, the loss of metadata may have limited impact
on the system's functioning. For other systems, which commonly
tailor content by region or network, the loss of metadata may imply a

loss of functionality. Where the user desires this functionality,
restoration can commonly be achieved by the use of other identifiers
or login procedures. Where the user does not desire this
functionality, but it is a preference of the server or a third party,
adjustment is more difficult. At the extreme, content blocking by
network origin may be a regulatory requirement. Trusting a network
intermediary to provide accurate data is, of course, fragile in this
case, but it may be a part of the regulatory framework.

There are also tensions with latency of operation. For example,
where the end system does not initially know the information that
would be added by on-path devices, it must engage the protocol
mechanisms to determine it. Determining a public IP address to
include in a locally supplied header might require a STUN exchange,
and the additional latency of this exchange discourages deployment of
host-based solutions. To minimize this latency, engaging those
mechanisms may need to be done in parallel with or in advance of the
core protocol exchanges with which this metadata would be supplied.

These tensions do not change the basic recommendation, but they
suggest that the parties who are introducing encryption and data
minimization for existing protocols consider carefully whether the
work also implies introducing mechanisms for the end-to-end
provisioning of metadata when a user has actively consented to
provide it.

6. IANA Considerations

   This document makes no request of IANA.

7. Security Considerations

   This memorandum describes a design pattern emerging from responses to
   the attacks described in [RFC7258]. Continued use of this design
   pattern, which uses mid-flow devices to restore metadata, lowers the
   impact of mitigations to that attack.

   Note that some emergency service recipients, notably PSAPs (Public
   Safety Answering Points) may prefer data provided by a network to
   data provided by an end system, because an end system could use false
   data to attack others or consume resources. While this has the
   consequence that the data available to the PSAP is often more coarse
   than that available to the end system, the risk of false data being
   provided involves a risk to the lives of those targeted.

8. References

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