Network Working Group J. Arkko
Request for Comments: 3776 Ericsson
Category: Standards Track V. Devarapalli
Nokia Research Center
F. Dupont
GET/ENST Bretagne
June 2004
Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between
Mobile Nodes and Home Agents
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
Mobile IPv6 uses IPsec to protect signaling between the home agent
and the mobile node. Mobile IPv6 base document defines the main
requirements these nodes must follow. This document discusses these
requirements in more depth, illustrates the used packet formats,
describes suitable configuration procedures, and shows how
implementations can process the packets in the right order.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Binding Updates and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Return Routability Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Prefix Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4 Payload Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Mandatory Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 Policy Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 IPsec Protocol Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4 Dynamic Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Example Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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5.1 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2 Manual Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2.1 Binding Updates and Acknowledgements . . . . . . 18
5.2.2 Return Routability Signaling . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2.3 Prefix Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2.4 Payload Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3 Dynamic Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3.1 Binding Updates and Acknowledgements . . . . . . 22
5.3.2 Return Routability Signaling . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3.3 Prefix Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.4 Payload Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. Processing Steps within a Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.1 Binding Update to the Home Agent . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2 Binding Update from the Mobile Node . . . . . . . . . 26
6.3 Binding Acknowledgement to the Mobile Node . . . . . . 27
6.4 Binding Acknowledgement from the Home Agent . . . . . 28
6.5 Home Test Init to the Home Agent . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.6 Home Test Init from the Mobile Node . . . . . . . . . 30
6.7 Home Test to the Mobile Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.8 Home Test from the Home Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.9 Prefix Solicitation Message to the Home Agent . . . . 31
6.10 Prefix Solicitation Message from the Mobile Node . . . 31
6.11 Prefix Advertisement Message to the Mobile Node . . . 32
6.12 Prefix Advertisement Message from the Home Agent . . . 32
6.13 Payload Packet to the Home Agent . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.14 Payload Packet from the Mobile Node . . . . . . . . . 32
6.15 Payload Packet to the Mobile Node . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.16 Payload Packet from the Home Agent . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.17 Establishing New Security Associations . . . . . . . . 32
6.18 Rekeying Security Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.19 Movements and Dynamic Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1 IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2 IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3 Bump-in-the-Stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
13. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
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1. Introduction
This document illustrates the use of IPsec in securing Mobile IPv6
[7] traffic between mobile nodes and home agents. In Mobile IPv6, a
mobile node is always expected to be addressable at its home address,
whether it is currently attached to its home link or is away from
home. The "home address" is an IP address assigned to the mobile
node within its home subnet prefix on its home link. While a mobile
node is at home, packets addressed to its home address are routed to
the mobile node's home link.
While a mobile node is attached to some foreign link away from home,
it is also addressable at a care-of address. A care-of address is an
IP address associated with a mobile node that has a subnet prefix
from a particular foreign link. The association between a mobile
node's home address and care-of address is known as a "binding" for
the mobile node. While away from home, a mobile node registers its
primary care-of address with a router on its home link, requesting
this router to function as the "home agent" for the mobile node. The
mobile node performs this binding registration by sending a "Binding
Update" message to the home agent. The home agent replies to the
mobile node by returning a "Binding Acknowledgement" message.
Any other nodes communicating with a mobile node are referred to as
"correspondent nodes". Mobile nodes can provide information about
their current location to correspondent nodes, again using Binding
Updates and Acknowledgements. Additionally, return routability test
is performed between the mobile node, home agent, and the
correspondent node in order to authorize the establishment of the
binding. Packets between the mobile node and the correspondent node
are either tunneled via the home agent, or sent directly if a binding
exists in the correspondent node for the current location of the
mobile node.
Mobile IPv6 tunnels payload packets between the mobile node and the
home agent in both directions. This tunneling uses IPv6
encapsulation [6]. Where these tunnels need to be secured, they are
replaced by IPsec tunnels [2].
Mobile IPv6 also provides support for the reconfiguration of the home
network. Here, the home subnet prefixes may change over time.
Mobile nodes can learn new information about home subnet prefixes
through the "prefix discovery" mechanism.
This document discusses security mechanisms for the control traffic
between the mobile node and the home agent. If this traffic is not
protected, mobile nodes and correspondent nodes are vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle, hijacking, passive wiretapping, impersonation, and
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denial-of-service attacks. Any third parties are also vulnerable to
denial-of-service attacks, for instance if an attacker could direct
the traffic flowing through the home agent to a innocent third party.
These attacks are discussed in more detail in Section 15.1 of the
Mobile IPv6 base specification [7].
In order to avoid these attacks, the base specification uses IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [3] to protect control traffic
between the home agent and the mobile node. This control traffic
consists of various messages carried by the Mobility Header protocol
in IPv6 [5]. The traffic takes the following forms:
o Binding Update and Acknowledgement messages exchanged between the
mobile node and the home agent, as described in Sections 10.3.1,
10.3.2, 11.7.1, and 11.7.3 of the base specification [7].
o Return routability messages Home Test Init and Home Test that pass
through the home agent on their way to a correspondent node, as
described in Section 10.4.6 of the base specification [7].
o ICMPv6 messages exchanged between the mobile node and the home
agent for the purposes of prefix discovery, as described in
Sections 10.6 and 11.4 of the base specification [7].
The nodes may also optionally protect payload traffic passing through
the home agent, as described in Section 5.5 of the base specification
[7]. If multicast group membership control protocols or stateful
address autoconfiguration protocols are supported, payload data
protection support is required.
The control traffic between the mobile node and the home agent
requires message authentication, integrity, correct ordering and
anti-replay protection. The mobile node and the home agent must have
an IPsec security association to protect this traffic. IPsec does
not proving correct ordering of messages. Correct ordering of the
control traffic is ensured by a sequence number in the Binding Update
and Binding Acknowledgement messages. The sequence number in the
Binding Updates also provides protection to a certain extent. It
fails in some scenarios, for example, if the Home Agent loses the
Binding Cache state. Full protection against replay attacks is
possible only when IKE is used.
Great care is needed when using IKE [4] to establish security
associations to Mobile IPv6 home agents. The right kind of addresses
must be used for transporting IKE. This is necessary to avoid
circular dependencies in which the use of a Binding Update triggers
the need for an IKE exchange that cannot complete prior to the
Binding Update having been completed.
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The mobile IPv6 base document defines the main requirements the
mobile nodes and home agents must follow when securing the above
traffic. This document discusses these requirements in more depth,
illustrates the used packet formats, describes suitable configuration
procedures, and shows how implementations can process the packets in
the right order.
We begin our description by showing the required wire formats for the
protected packets in Section 3. Section 4 describes rules which
associated Mobile IPv6, IPsec, and IKE implementations must observe.
Section 5 discusses how to configure either manually keyed IPsec
security associations or how to configure IKE to establish them
automatically. Section 6 shows examples of how packets are processed
within the nodes.
All implementations of Mobile IPv6 mobile node and home agent MUST
support at least the formats described in Section 3 and obey the
rules in Section 4.
The configuration and processing sections are informative, and should
only be considered as one possible way of providing the required
functionality.
Note that where this document indicates a feature MUST be supported
and SHOULD be used, this implies that all implementations must be
capable of using the specified feature, but there may be cases where,
for instance, a configuration option disables to use of the feature
in a particular situation.
2. Terminology
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
3. Packet Formats
3.1. Binding Updates and Acknowledgements
When the mobile node is away from its home, the BUs sent by it to the
home agent MUST support at least the following headers in the
following order:
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (home address)
ESP header in transport mode
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Mobility header
Binding Update
Alternate Care-of Address option (care-of address)
Note that the Alternate Care-of Address option is used to ensure that
the care-of address is protected by ESP. The home agent considers
the address within this option as the current care-of address for the
mobile node. The home address is not protected by ESP directly, but
the use of a specific home address with a specific security
association is required by policy.
The Binding Acknowledgements sent back to the mobile node when it is
away from home MUST support at least the following headers in the
following order:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
Routing header (type 2)
home address
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
When the mobile node is at home, the above rules are different as the
mobile node can use its home address as a source address. This
typically happens for the de-registration Binding Update when the
mobile is returning home. In this situation, the Binding Updates
MUST support at least the following headers in the following order:
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Update
The Binding Acknowledgement messages sent to the home address MUST
support at least the following headers in the following order:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = home address)
ESP header in transport mode
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
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3.2. Return Routability Signaling
When the Home Test Init messages tunneled to the home agent are
protected by IPsec, they MUST support at least the following headers
in the following order:
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
ESP header in tunnel mode
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = correspondent node)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
This format assumes that the mobile node's current care-of address is
used as the outer header destination address in the security
association. As discussed in Section 4.3, this requires the home
agent to update the destination address when the mobile node moves.
Policy entries and security association selectors stay the same,
however, as the inner packets do not change upon movements.
Note that there are trade-offs in using care-of addresses as the
destination addresses versus using the home address and attaching an
additional Home Address destination option and/or Routing header to
the packets. The basis for requiring support for at least the
care-of address case has been discussed in Section 7.
Similarly, when the Home Test messages tunneled from the home agent
are protected by IPsec, they MUST support at least the following
headers in the following order:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
ESP header in tunnel mode
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination = home address)
Mobility Header
Home Test
The format used to protect return routability packets relies on the
destination of the tunnel packets to change for the mobile node as it
moves. The home agent's address stays the same, but the mobile
node's address changes upon movements, as if the security
association's outer header destination address had changed. When the
mobile node adopts a new care-of address, it adopts also a new source
address for outgoing tunnel packets. The home agent accepts packets
sent like this, as the outer source address in tunnel packets is not
checked according to the rules in RFC 2401. (We note, however, that
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some implementations are known to make source address checks.) For a
discussion of the role of source addresses in outer tunnel headers,
see Section 5.1.2.1 of RFC 2401 [2]. Note also that the home agent
requires the packets to be authenticated regardless of the source
address change, hence the "new" sender must possess the same keys for
the security association as it had in the previous location. This
proves that the sender is the same entity, regardless of the changes
in the addresses.
The process is more complicated in the home agent side, as the home
agent has stored the previous care-of address in its Security
Association Database as the outer header destination address. When
IKE is being used, the mobile node runs it on top of its current
care-of address, and the resulting tunnel-mode security associations
will use the same addresses as IKE run over. In order for the home
agent to be able to tunnel a Home Test message to the mobile node, it
uses the current care-of address as the destination of the tunnel
packets, as if the home agent had modified the outer header
destination address in the security association used for this
protection. This implies that the same security association can be
used in multiple locations, and no new configuration or
re-establishment of IKE phases is needed per movement. Section 5.2.2
discusses the security policy and security association database
entries that are needed to accomplish this.
3.3. Prefix Discovery
If IPsec is used to protect prefix discovery, requests for prefixes
from the mobile node to the home agent MUST support at least the
following headers in the following order.
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (home address)
ESP header in transport mode
ICMPv6
Mobile Prefix Solicitation
Again if IPsec is used, solicited and unsolicited prefix information
advertisements from the home agent to the mobile node MUST support at
least the following headers in the following order.
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
Routing header (type 2)
home address
ESP header in transport mode
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ICMPv6
Mobile Prefix Advertisement
3.4. Payload Packets
If IPsec is used to protect payload packets tunneled to the home
agent from the mobile node, we use a format similar to the one in
Section 3.2. However, instead of the MobilityHeader, these packets
may contain any legal IPv6 protocol(s):
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
ESP header in tunnel mode
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = correspondent node)
Any protocol
Similarly, when the payload packets are tunneled from the home agent
to the mobile node with ESP encapsulation, they MUST support at least
the following headers in the following order:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
ESP header in tunnel mode
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination = home address)
Any protocol
4. Requirements
This section describes mandatory rules for all Mobile IPv6 mobile
nodes and home agents. These rules are necessary in order for it to
be possible to enable IPsec communications despite movements,
guarantee sufficient security, and to ensure correct processing order
of packets.
The rules in the following sections apply only to the communications
between home agents and mobile nodes. They should not be taken as
requirements on how IPsec in general is used by mobile nodes.
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4.1. Mandatory Support
The following requirements apply to both home agents and mobile
nodes:
o Manual configuration of IPsec security associations MUST be
supported. The configuration of the keys is expected to take
place out-of-band, for instance at the time the mobile node is
configured to use its home agent.
o Automatic key management with IKE [4] MAY be supported. Only
IKEv1 is discussed in this document. Other automatic key
management mechanisms exist and will appear beyond IKEv1, but this
document does not address the issues related to them.
o ESP encapsulation of Binding Updates and Acknowledgements between
the mobile node and home agent MUST be supported and MUST be used.
o ESP encapsulation of the Home Test Init and Home Test messages
tunneled between the mobile node and home agent MUST be supported
and SHOULD be used.
o ESP encapsulation of the ICMPv6 messages related to prefix
discovery MUST be supported and SHOULD be used.
o ESP encapsulation of the payload packets tunneled between the
mobile node and home agent MAY be supported and used.
o If multicast group membership control protocols or stateful
address autoconfiguration protocols are supported, payload data
protection MUST be supported for those protocols.
4.2. Policy Requirements
The following requirements apply to both home agents and mobile
nodes:
o As required in the base specification [7], when a packet destined
to the receiving node is matched against IPsec security policy or
selectors of a security association, an address appearing in a
Home Address destination option is considered as the source
address of the packet.
Note that the home address option appears before IPsec headers.
Section 11.3.2 of the base specification describes one possible
implementation approach for this: The IPsec policy operations can
be performed at the time when the packet has not yet been modified
per Mobile IPv6 rules, or has been brought back to its normal form
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after Mobile IPv6 processing. That is, the processing of the Home
Address option is seen as a fixed transformation of the packets
that does not affect IPsec processing.
o Similarly, a home address within a Type 2 Routing header destined
to the receiving node is considered as the destination address of
the packet, when a packet is matched against IPsec security policy
or selectors of a security association.
Similar implementation considers apply to the Routing header
processing as was described above for the Home Address destination
option.
o When IPsec is used to protect return routability signaling or
payload packets, this protection MUST only be applied to the
return routability packets entering the IPv6 encapsulated tunnel
interface between the mobile node and the home agent. This can be
achieved, for instance, by defining the security policy database
entries specifically for the tunnel interface. That is, the
policy entries are not generally applied on all traffic on the
physical interface(s) of the nodes, but rather only on traffic
that enters this tunnel.
o The authentication of mobile nodes MAY be based either on machine
or user credentials. Note that multi-user operating systems
typically allow all users of a node to use any of the IP addresses
assigned to the node. This limits the capability of the home
agent to restrict the use of a home address to a particular user
in such environment. Where user credentials are applied in a
multi-user environment, the configuration should authorize all
users of the node to control all home addresses assigned to the
node.
o When the mobile node returns home and de-registers with the Home
Agent, the tunnel between the home agent and the mobile node's
care-of address is torn down. The security policy entries, which
were used for protecting tunneled traffic between the mobile node
and the home agent MUST be made inactive (for instance, by
removing them and installing them back later through an API). The
corresponding security associations could be kept as they are or
deleted depending on how they were created. If the security
associations were created dynamically using IKE, they are
automatically deleted when they expire. If the security
associations were created through manual configuration, they MUST
be retained and used later when the mobile node moves away from
home again. The security associations protecting Binding Updates
and Acknowledgements, and prefix discovery SHOULD NOT be deleted
as they do not depend on care-of addresses and can be used again.
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The following rules apply to mobile nodes:
o The mobile node MUST use the Home Address destination option in
Binding Updates and Mobile Prefix Solicitations, sent to the home
agent from a care-of address.
o When the mobile node receives a changed set of prefixes from the
home agent during prefix discovery, there is a need to configure
new security policy entries, and there may be a need to configure
new security associations. It is outside the scope of this
specification to discuss automatic methods for this.
The following rules apply to home agents:
o The home agent MUST use the Type 2 Routing header in Binding
Acknowledgements and Mobile Prefix Advertisements sent to the
mobile node, again due to the need to have the home address
visible when the policy checks are made.
o It is necessary to avoid the possibility that a mobile node could
use its security association to send a Binding Update on behalf of
another mobile node using the same home agent. In order to do
this, the security policy database entries MUST unequivocally
identify a single security association for protecting Binding
Updates between any given home address and home agent when
manually keyed IPsec security associations are used. When dynamic
keying is used, the security policy database entries MUST
unequivocally identify the IKE phase 1 credentials which can be
used to authorize the creation of security associations for
protecting Binding Updates for a particular home address. How
these mappings are maintained is outside the scope of this
specification, but they may be maintained, for instance, as a
locally administered table in the home agent. If the phase 1
identity is a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), secure forms of
DNS may also be used.
o When the set of prefixes advertised by the home agent changes,
there is a need to configure new security policy entries, and
there may be a need to configure new security associations. It is
outside the scope of this specification to discuss automatic
methods for this, if new home addresses are required.
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4.3. IPsec Protocol Processing
The following requirements apply to both home agents and mobile
nodes:
o When securing Binding Updates, Binding Acknowledgements, and
prefix discovery, both the mobile nodes and the home agents MUST
support and SHOULD use the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
[3] header in transport mode and MUST use a non-null payload
authentication algorithm to provide data origin authentication,
connectionless integrity and optional anti-replay protection.
Mandatory support for encryption and integrity protection
algorithms is as defined in RFC 2401 [2], RFC 2402 [8], and RFC
2406 [3]. Care is needed when selecting suitable encryption
algorithms for ESP, however. Currently available integrity
protection algorithms are in general considered to be secure. The
encryption algorithm, DES, mandated by the current IPsec standards
is not, however. This is particularly problematic when IPsec
security associations are configured manually, as the same key is
used for a long time.
o Tunnel mode IPsec ESP MUST be supported and SHOULD be used for the
protection of packets belonging to the return routability
procedure. A non-null encryption transform and a non-null
authentication algorithm MUST be applied.
Note that the return routability procedure involves two message
exchanges from the mobile node to the correspondent node. The
purpose of these exchanges is to assure that the mobile node is
live at the claimed home and care-of addresses. One of the
exchanges is sent directly to and from the correspondent node,
while another one is tunneled through the home agent. If an
attacker is on the mobile node's link and the mobile node's
current link is an unprotected wireless link, the attacker would
able to see both sets of messages, and launch attacks based on it
(these attacks are discussed further in Section 15.4 of the base
specification [7].) One can prevent the attack by making sure
that the packets tunneled through the home agent are encrypted.
Note that this specification concerns itself only with on-the-wire
formats, and does not dictate specific implementations mechanisms.
In the case of IPsec tunnel mode, the use of IP-in-IP
encapsulation followed by IPsec transport mode encapsulation may
also be possible.
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The following rules apply to mobile nodes:
o When ESP is used to protect Binding Updates, there is no
protection for the care-of address which appears in the IPv6
header outside the area protected by ESP. It is important for the
home agent to verify that the care-of address has not been
tampered with. As a result, the attacker would have redirected
the mobile node's traffic to another address. In order to prevent
this, Mobile IPv6 implementations MUST use the Alternate Care-of
Address mobility option in Binding Updates sent by mobile nodes
while away from home. The exception to this is when the mobile
node returns home and sends a Binding Update to the home agent in
order to de-register. In this case no Alternate Care-of Address
option is needed, as described in Section 3.1.
When IPsec is used to protect return routability signaling or
payload packets, the mobile node MUST set the source address it
uses for the outgoing tunnel packets to the current primary care-
of address. The mobile node starts to use a new primary care-of
address immediately after sending a Binding Update to the home
agent to register this new address. Similarly, it starts to use
the new address as the required destination address of tunneled
packets received from the home agent.
The following rules apply to home agents:
o When IPsec is used to protect return routability signaling or
payload packets, IPsec security associations are needed to provide
this protection. When the care-of address for the mobile node
changes as a result of an accepted Binding Update, special
treatment is needed for the next packets sent using these security
associations. The home agent MUST set the new care-of address as
the destination address of these packets, as if the outer header
destination address in the security association had changed.
Similarly, the home agent starts to expect the new source address
in the tunnel packets received from the mobile node.
Such address changes can be implemented, for instance, through an
API from the Mobile IPv6 implementation to the IPsec
implementation. It should be noted that the use of such an API
and the address changes MUST only be done based on the Binding
Updates received by the home agent and protected by the use of
IPsec. Address modifications based on other sources, such as
Binding Updates to the correspondent nodes protected by return
routability, or open access to an API from any application may
result in security vulnerabilities.
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
4.4. Dynamic Keying
The following requirements apply to both home agents and mobile
nodes:
o If anti-replay protection is required, dynamic keying MUST be
used. IPsec can provide anti-replay protection only if dynamic
keying is used (which may not always be the case). IPsec also
does not guarantee correct ordering of packets, only that they
have not been replayed. Because of this, sequence numbers within
the Mobile IPv6 messages are used to ensure correct ordering.
However, if the 16 bit Mobile IPv6 sequence number space is cycled
through, or the home agent reboots and loses its state regarding
the sequence numbers, replay and reordering attacks become
possible. The use of dynamic keying, IPsec anti-replay
protection, and the Mobile IPv6 sequence numbers can together
prevent such attacks.
o If IKE version 1 is used with preshared secrets in main mode, it
determines the shared secret to use from the IP address of the
peer. With Mobile IPv6, however, this may be a care-of address
and does not indicate which mobile node attempts to contact the
home agent. Therefore, if preshared secret authentication is used
in IKEv1 between the mobile node and the home agent then
aggressive mode MUST be used. Note also that care needs to be
taken with phase 1 identity selection. Where the ID_IPV6_ADDR
Identity Payloads is used, unambiguous mapping of identities to
keys is not possible. (The next version of IKE may not have these
limitations.)
Note that the difficulties with main mode and preshared secrets in
IKE version 1 are well known for dynamic addresses. With static
addresses, there has not been a problem. With Mobile IPv6, however,
the use of the care-of addresses to run IKE to the home agent
presents a problem even when the home address stays stable. Further
discussion about the use of care-of addresses in this way appears in
Section 7.
The following rules apply to mobile nodes:
o In addition to the rules above, if dynamic keying is used, the key
management protocol MUST use the care-of address as the source
address in the protocol exchanges with the mobile node's home
agent.
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
o However, the IPsec security associations with the mobile node's
home agent use home addresses. That is, the IPsec security
associations MUST be requested from the key management protocol
using the home address of the mobile node as the client identity.
The security associations for protecting Binding Updates and
Acknowledgements are requested for the Mobility header protocol in
transport mode and for specific IP addresses as endpoints. No
other selectors are used. Similarly, the security associations
for protecting prefix discovery are requested for the ICMPv6
protocol and the specific IP addresses, again without other
selectors. Security associations for payload and return
routability protection are requested for a specific tunnel
interface and either the payload protocol or the Mobility header
protocol, in tunnel mode. In this case one requested endpoint is
an IP address and the other one is a wildcard, and there are no
other selectors.
o If the mobile node has used IKE version 1 to establish security
associations with its home agent, it should follow the procedures
discussed in Section 11.7.1 and 11.7.3 of the base specification
[7] to determine whether the IKE endpoints can be moved or if IKE
phase 1 has to be re-established.
The following rules apply to home agents:
o If the home agent has used IKE version 1 to establish security
associations with the mobile node, it should follow the procedures
discussed in Section 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 of the base specification
[7] to determine whether the IKE endpoints can be moved or if IKE
phase 1 has to be re-established.
5. Example Configurations
In the following we describe the Security Policy Database (SPD) and
Security Association Database (SAD) entries necessary to protect
Binding Updates and Binding Acknowledgements exchanged between the
mobile node and the home agent.
Section 5.1 introduces the format we use in the description of the
SPD and the SAD. Section 5.2 describes how to configure manually
keyed IPsec security associations without dynamic keying, and Section
5.3 describes how to use dynamic keying.
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5.1. Format
The format used in the examples is as follows. The SPD description
has the format
<node> "SPD OUT:"
"-" <spdentry>
"-" <spdentry>
...
"-" <spdentry>
<node> "SPD IN:"
"-" <spdentry>
"-" <spdentry>
...
"-" <spdentry>
Where <node> represents the name of the node, and <spdentry> has the
following format:
"IF" <condition> "THEN USE SA " <sa> |
"IF" <condition> "THEN USE SA " <pattern> |
Where <condition> is a boolean expression about the fields of the
IPv6 packet, <sa> is the name of a specific security association, and
<pattern> is a specification for a security association to be
negotiated via IKE [4]. The SAD description has the format
<node> "SAD:"
"-" <sadentry>
"-" <sadentry>
...
"-" <sadentry>
Where <node> represents the name of the node, and <sadentry> has the
following format:
<sa> "(" <dir> ","
<spi> ","
<destination> ","
<ipsec-proto> ","
<mode> ")" ":"
<rule>
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Where <dir> is "IN" or "OUT", <spi> is the SPI of the security
association, <destination> is its destination, <ipsec-proto> is in
our case "ESP", <mode> is either "TUNNEL" or "TRANSPORT", and <rule>
is an expression which describes the IPsec selectors, i.e., which
fields of the IPv6 packet must have which values.
We will be using an example mobile node in this section with the home
address "home_address_1". The user's identity in this mobile node is
"user_1". The home agent's address is "home_agent_1".
5.2. Manual Configuration
5.2.1. Binding Updates and Acknowledgements
Here are the contents of the SPD and SAD for protecting Binding
Updates and Acknowledgements:
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA1
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA2
mobile node SAD:
- SA1(OUT, spi_a, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH
- SA2(IN, spi_b, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA2
home agent SPD IN:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA1
home agent SAD:
- SA2(OUT, spi_b, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
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proto = MH
- SA1(IN, spi_a, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH
In the above, "MH" refers to the protocol number for the Mobility
Header [7].
5.2.2. Return Routability Signaling
In the following we describe the necessary SPD and SAD entries to
protect return routability signaling between the mobile node and the
home agent. Note that the rules in the SPD are ordered, and the ones
in the previous section must take precedence over these ones. In
other words, the higher precedence entries must occur first in the
RFC 2401 [2] ordered list of SPD entries.
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 IPv6 tunnel to home_agent_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA3
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_agent_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA4
mobile node SAD:
- SA3(OUT, spi_c, home_agent_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = home_address_1 & destination = any & proto = MH
- SA4(IN, spi_d, care_of_address_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = any & destination = home_address_1 & proto = MH
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel to home_address_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA4
home agent SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_address_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA SA3
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home agent SAD:
- SA4(OUT, spi_d, care_of_address_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = any & destination = home_address_1 & proto = MH
- SA3(IN, spi_c, home_agent_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = home_address_1 & destination = any & proto = MH
The security association from the home agent to the mobile node uses
the current care-of address as the destination. As discussed
earlier, this address is updated in the SAD as the mobile node moves.
It can be initialized to the home address before the mobile node has
registered.
5.2.3. Prefix Discovery
In the following we describe some additional SPD and SAD entries to
protect prefix discovery. Note that the SPDs described above protect
all ICMPv6 traffic between the mobile node and the home agent, as
IPsec may not have the ability to distinguish between different
ICMPv6 types.
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA SA5.
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA SA6
mobile node SAD:
- SA5(OUT, spi_e, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
- SA6(IN, spi_f, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA SA6
home agent SPD IN:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA SA5
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
home agent SAD:
- SA6(OUT, spi_f, home_address_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
- SA5(IN, spi_e, home_agent_1, ESP, TRANSPORT):
source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
5.2.4. Payload Packets
It is also possible to perform some additional, optional, protection
of tunneled payload packets. This protection takes place in a
similar manner to the return routability protection above, but
requires a different value for the protocol field. The necessary SPD
and SAD entries are shown below. It is assumed that the entries for
protecting Binding Updates and Acknowledgements, and the entries to
protect Home Test Init and Home Test messages take precedence over
these entries.
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel to home_agent_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = X
THEN USE SA SA7
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_agent_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = X
THEN USE SA SA8
mobile node SAD:
- SA7(OUT, spi_g, home_agent_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = home_address_1 & destination = any & proto = X
- SA8(IN, spi_h, care_of_address_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = any & destination = home_address_1 & proto = X
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel to home_address_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = X
THEN USE SA SA8
home agent SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_address_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = X
THEN USE SA SA7
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
home agent SAD:
- SA8(OUT, spi_h, care_of_address_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = any & destination = home_address_1 & proto = X
- SA7(IN, spi_g, home_agent_1, ESP, TUNNEL):
source = home_address_1 & destination = any & proto = X
If multicast group membership control protocols such as MLDv1 [9] or
MLDv2 [11] need to be protected, these packets may use a link-local
address rather than the home address of the mobile node. In this
case the source and destination can be left as a wildcard and the SPD
entries will work solely based on the used interface and the
protocol, which is ICMPv6 for both MLDv1 and MLDv2.
Similar problems are encountered when stateful address
autoconfiguration protocols such as DHCPv6 [10] are used. The same
approach is applicable for DHCPv6 as well. DHCPv6 uses the UDP
protocol.
Support for multiple layers of encapsulation (such as ESP
encapsulated in ESP) is not required by RFC 2401 [2] and is also
otherwise often problematic. It is therefore useful to avoid setting
the protocol X in the above entries to either AH or ESP.
5.3. Dynamic Keying
In this section we show an example configuration that uses IKE to
negotiate security associations.
5.3.1. Binding Updates and Acknowledgements
Here are the contents of the SPD for protecting Binding Updates and
Acknowledgements:
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local phase 1 identity = user_1
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local phase 1 identity = user_1
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer phase 1 identity = user_1
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
home agent SPD IN:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer phase 1 identity = user_1
We have omitted details of the proposed transforms in the above, and
all details related to the particular authentication method such as
certificates beyond listing a specific identity that must be used.
We require IKE version 1 to be run using the care-of addresses but
still negotiate IPsec SAs that use home addresses. The extra
conditions set by the home agent SPD for the peer phase 1 identity to
be "user_1" must be verified by the home agent. The purpose of the
condition is to ensure that the IKE phase 2 negotiation for a given
user's home address can not be requested by another user. In the
mobile node, we simply set our local identity to be "user_1".
These checks also imply that the configuration of the home agent is
user-specific: every user or home address requires a specific
configuration entry. It would be possible to alleviate the
configuration tasks by using certificates that have home addresses in
the Subject AltName field. However, it is not clear if all IKE
implementations allow one address to be used for carrying the IKE
negotiations when another address is mentioned in the used
certificates. In any case, even this approach would have required
user-specific tasks in the certification authority.
5.3.2. Return Routability Signaling
Protection for the return routability signaling can be configured in
a similar manner as above.
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel to home_agent_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_agent_1 &
local phase 1 identity = user_1
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_agent_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_agent_1 &
local phase 1 identity = user_1
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel to home_address_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_address_1 &
peer phase 1 identity = user_1
home agent SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_address_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = MH
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_address_1 &
peer phase 1 identity = user_1
The security association from the home agent to the mobile node uses
the current care-of address as the destination. As discussed
earlier, this address is updated in the SAD as the mobile node moves.
The SPD entries can be written using the home address (as above), if
the care-of address update in the SAD is also done upon the creation
of security associations.
5.3.3. Prefix Discovery
In the following we describe some additional SPD entries to protect
prefix discovery with IKE. (Note that when actual new prefixes are
discovered, there may be a need to enter new manually configured SPD
entries to specify the authorization policy for the resulting new
home addresses.)
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local phase 1 identity = user_1
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: local phase 1 identity = user_1
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF source = home_agent_1 & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer phase 1 identity = user_1
home agent SPD IN:
- IF source = home_address_1 & destination = home_agent_1 &
proto = ICMPv6
THEN USE SA ESP TRANSPORT: peer phase 1 identity = user_1
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
5.3.4. Payload Packets
Protection for the payload packets happens similarly to the
protection of return routability signaling. As in the manually keyed
case, these SPD entries have lower priority than the above ones.
mobile node SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel to home_agent_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = X
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_agent_1 &
local phase 1 identity = user_1
mobile node SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_agent_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = X
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_agent_1 &
local phase 1 identity = user_1
home agent SPD OUT:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel to home_address_1 &
source = any & destination = home_address_1 &
proto = X
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_address_1 &
peer phase 1 identity = user_1
home agent SPD IN:
- IF interface = IPv6 tunnel from home_address_1 &
source = home_address_1 & destination = any &
proto = X
THEN USE SA ESP TUNNEL: outer destination = home_address_1 &
peer phase 1 identity = user_1
6. Processing Steps within a Node
6.1. Binding Update to the Home Agent
Step 1. At the mobile node, Mobile IPv6 module first produces the
following packet:
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
Mobility header
Binding Update
Step 2. This packet is matched against the IPsec SPD on the mobile
node and we make a note that IPsec must be applied.
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Step 3. Then, we add the necessary Mobile IPv6 options but do not
change the addresses yet, as described in Section 11.3.2 of the base
specification [7]. This results in:
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (care-of address)
Mobility header
Binding Update
Step 4. Finally, IPsec headers are added and the necessary
authenticator values are calculated:
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (care-of address)
ESP header (SPI = spi_a)
Mobility header
Binding Update
Here spi_a is the SPI value that was either configured manually, or
agreed upon in an earlier IKE negotiation.
Step 5. Before sending the packet, the addresses in the IPv6 header
and the Destination Options header are changed:
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (home address)
ESP header (SPI = spi_a)
Mobility header
Binding Update
6.2. Binding Update from the Mobile Node
Step 1. The following packet is received at the home agent:
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (home address)
ESP header (SPI = spi_a)
Mobility header
Binding Update
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Step 2. The home address option is processed first, which results in
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (care-of address)
ESP header (SPI = spi_a)
Mobility header
Binding Update
Step 3. ESP header is processed next, resulting in
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
Destination Options header
Home Address option (care-of address)
Mobility header
Binding Update
Step 4. This packet matches the policy required for this security
association (source = home address, destination = home agent, proto =
MH).
Step 5. Mobile IPv6 processes the Binding Update. The Binding
Update is delivered to the Mobile IPv6 module.
Step 6. If there are any security associations in the security
association database for the protection of return routability or
payload packets for this mobile node, those security associations are
updated with the new care-of address.
6.3. Binding Acknowledgement to the Mobile Node
Step 1. Mobile IPv6 produces the following packet:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = home address)
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
Step 2. This packet matches the IPsec policy entries, and we
remember that IPsec has to be applied.
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
Step 3. Then, we add the necessary Route Headers but do not change
the addresses yet, as described in Section 9.5.4 of the base
specification [7]. This results in:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = home address)
Routing header (type 2)
care-of address
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
Step 4. We apply IPsec:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = home address)
Routing header (type 2)
care-of address
ESP header (SPI = spi_b)
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
Step 5. Finally, before sending the packet out we change the
addresses in the IPv6 header and the Route header:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
Routing header (type 2)
home address
ESP header (SPI = spi_b)
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
6.4. Binding Acknowledgement from the Home Agent
Step 1. The following packet is received at the mobile node
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
Routing header (type 2)
home address
ESP header (SPI = spi_b)
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
Step 2. After the routing header is processed the packet becomes
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = home address)
Routing header (type 2)
care-of address
ESP header (SPI = spi_b)
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
Step 3. ESP header is processed next, resulting in:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = home address)
Routing header (type 2)
care-of address
Mobility header
Binding Acknowledgement
Step 4. This packet matches the policy required for this security
association (source = home agent, destination = home address, proto =
MH).
Step 5. The Binding Acknowledgement is delivered to the Mobile IPv6
module.
6.5. Home Test Init to the Home Agent
Step 1. The mobile node constructs a Home Test Init message:
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = correspondent node)
Mobility header
Home Test Init
Step 2. Mobile IPv6 determines that this packet should go to the
tunnel to the home agent.
Step 3. The packet is matched against IPsec policy entries for the
interface, and we find that IPsec needs to be applied.
Step 4. IPsec tunnel mode headers are added. Note that we use a
care-of address as a source address for the tunnel packet.
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
ESP header (SPI = spi_c)
IPv6 header (source = home address,
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
destination = correspondent node)
Mobility header
Home Test Init
Step 5. The packet is sent directly to the home agent using IPsec
encapsulation.
6.6. Home Test Init from the Mobile Node
Step 1. The home agent receives the following packet:
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
ESP header (SPI = spi_c)
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = correspondent node)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
Step 2. IPsec processing is performed, resulting in:
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = correspondent node)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
Step 3. The resulting packet matches the policy required for this
security association and the packet can be processed further.
Step 4. The packet is then forwarded to the correspondent node.
6.7. Home Test to the Mobile Node
Step 1. The home agent receives a Home Test packet from the
correspondent node:
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination = home address)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
Step 2. The home agent determines that this packet is destined to a
mobile node that is away from home, and decides to tunnel it.
Step 3. The packet matches the IPsec policy entries for the tunnel
interface, and we note that IPsec needs to be applied.
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
Step 4. IPsec is applied, resulting in a new packet. Note that the
home agent must keep track of the location of the mobile node, and
update the tunnel endpoint address in the security association(s)
accordingly.
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
ESP header (SPI = spi_d)
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination = home address)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
Step 5. The packet is sent directly to the care-of address using
IPsec encapsulation.
6.8. Home Test from the Home Agent
Step 1. The mobile node receives the following packet:
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
ESP header (SPI = spi_d)
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination = home address)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
Step 2. IPsec is processed, resulting in:
IPv6 header (source = correspondent node,
destination = home address)
Mobility Header
Home Test Init
Step 3. This matches the policy required for this security
association (source = any, destination = home address).
Step 4. The packet is given to Mobile IPv6 processing.
6.9. Prefix Solicitation Message to the Home Agent
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.1.
6.10. Prefix Solicitation Message from the Mobile Node
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.2.
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6.11. Prefix Advertisement Message to the Mobile Node
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.3.
6.12. Prefix Advertisement Message from the Home Agent
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.4.
6.13. Payload Packet to the Home Agent
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.5.
6.14. Payload Packet from the Mobile Node
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.6.
6.15. Payload Packet to the Mobile Node
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.7.
6.16. Payload Packet from the Home Agent
This procedure is similar to the one presented in Section 6.8.
6.17. Establishing New Security Associations
Step 1. The mobile node wishes to send a Binding Update to the home
agent.
IPv6 header (source = home address,
destination = home agent)
Mobility header
Binding Update
Step 2. There is no existing security association to protect the
Binding Update, so the mobile node initiates IKE. The IKE packets
are sent as shown in the following examples. The first packet is an
example of an IKE packet sent from the mobile node, and the second
one is from the home agent. The examples shows also that the phase 1
identity used for the mobile node is a FQDN.
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
UDP
IKE
... IDii = ID_FQDN mn123.ha.net ...
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IPv6 header (source = home agent
destination = care-of address)
UDP
IKE
... IDir = ID_FQDN ha.net ...
Step 3. IKE phase 1 completes, and phase 2 is initiated to request
security associations for protecting traffic between the mobile
node's home address and the home agent. These addresses will be used
as selectors. This involves sending and receiving additional IKE
packets. The below example shows again one packet sent by the mobile
node and another sent by the home agent. The example shows also that
the phase 2 identity used for the mobile node is the mobile node's
home address.
IPv6 header (source = care-of address,
destination = home agent)
UDP
IKE
... IDci = ID_IPV6_ADDR home address ...
IPv6 header (source = home agent,
destination = care-of address)
UDP
IKE
... IDcr = ID_IPV6_ADDR home agent ...
Step 4. The remaining steps are as shown in Section 6.1.
6.18. Rekeying Security Associations
Step 1. The mobile node and the home agent have existing security
associations. Either side may decide at any time that the security
associations need to be rekeyed, for instance, because the specified
lifetime is approaching.
Step 2. Mobility header packets sent during rekey may be protected
by the existing security associations.
Step 3. When the rekeying is finished, new security associations are
established. In practice there is a time interval during which an
old, about-to-expire security association and newly established
security association will both exist. The new ones should be used as
soon as they become available.
Step 4. A notification of the deletion of the old security
associations is received. After this, only the new security
associations can be used.
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Note that there is no requirement that the existence of the IPsec and
IKE security associations is tied to the existence of bindings. It
is not necessary to delete a security association if a binding is
removed, as a new binding may soon be established after this.
Since cryptographic acceleration hardware may only be able to handle
a limited number of active security associations, security
associations may be deleted via IKE in order to keep the number of
active cryptographic contexts to a minimum. Such deletions should
not be interpreted as a sign of losing a contact to the peer or as a
reason to remove a binding. Rather, if additional traffic needs to
be sent, it is preferable to bring up another security association to
protect it.
6.19. Movements and Dynamic Keying
In this section we describe the sequence of events that relate to
movement with IKE-based security associations. In the initial state,
the mobile node is not registered in any location and has no security
associations with the home agent. Depending on whether the peers
will be able to move IKE endpoints to new care-of addresses, the
actions taken in Step 9 and 10 are different.
Step 1. Mobile node with the home address A moves to care-of address
B.
Step 2. Mobile node runs IKE from care-of address B to the home
agent, establishing a phase 1. The home agent can only act as the
responder before it knows the current location of the mobile node.
Step 3. Protected by this phase 1, mobile node establishes a pair of
security associations for protecting Mobility Header traffic to and
from the home address A.
Step 4. Mobile node sends a Binding Update and receives a Binding
Acknowledgement using the security associations created in Step 3.
Step 5. Mobile node establishes a pair of security associations for
protecting return routability packets. These security associations
are in tunnel mode and their endpoint in the mobile node side is
care-of address B. For the purposes of our example, this step uses
the phase 1 connection established in Step 2. Multiple phase 1
connections are also possible.
Step 6. The mobile node uses the security associations created in
Step 5 to run return routability.
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Step 7. The mobile node moves to a new location and adopts a new
care-of address C.
Step 8. Mobile node sends a Binding Update and receives a Binding
Acknowledgement using the security associations created in Step 3.
The home agent ensures that the next packets sent using the security
associations created in Step 5 will have the new care-of address as
their destination address, as if the outer header destination address
in the security association had changed.
Step 9. If the mobile node and the HA have the capability to change
the IKE endpoints, they change the address to C. If they do not have
the capability, both nodes remove their phase 1 connections created
on top of the care-of address B and will establish a new IKE phase 1
on top of the care-of address C. This capability to change the IKE
phase 1 end points is indicated through setting the Key Management
Mobility Capability (K) flag [7] in the Binding Update and Binding
Acknowledgement messages.
Step 10. If a new IKE phase 1 connection was setup after movement,
the MN will not be able to receive any notifications delivered on top
of the old IKE phase 1 security association. Notifications delivered
on top of the new security association are received and processed
normally. If the mobile node and HA were able to update the IKE
endpoints, they can continue using the same IKE phase 1 connection.
7. Implementation Considerations
7.1. IPsec
Note that packet formats and header ordering discussed in Section 3
must be supported, but implementations may also support other
formats. In general, the use of formats not required here may lead
to incorrect processing of the packets by the peer (such as silently
discarding them), unless support for these formats has been verified
off-line. Such verification can take place at the same time the
parameters of the security associations are agreed upon. In some
cases, however, basic IPv6 specifications call for support of options
not discussed here. In these cases, such a verification step might
be unnecessary as long as the peer fully supports the relevant IPv6
specifications. However, no claims are made in this document about
the validity of these other formats in the context of Mobile IPv6.
It is also likely that systems that support Mobile IPv6 have been
tested more extensively with the required formats.
We have chosen to require an encapsulation format for return
routability and payload packet protection which can only be realized
if the destination of the IPsec packets sent from the home agent can
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be changed as the mobile node moves. One of the main reasons for
choosing such a format is that it removes the overhead of twenty four
bytes when a home address option or routing header is added to the
tunneled packet. Such an overhead would not be significant for the
protection of the return routability packets, but would create an
additional overhead if IPsec is used to protect the tunneling of
payload packets to the home agent. This overhead may be significant
for real-time traffic. Given that the use of the shorter packet
formats for any traffic requires the existence of suitable APIs, we
have chosen to require support for the shorter packet formats both
for payload and return routability packets.
In order to support the care-of address as the destination address on
the mobile node side, the home agent must act as if the outer header
destination address in the security association to the mobile node
would have changed upon movements. Implementations are free to
choose any particular method to make this change, such as using an
API to the IPsec implementation to change the parameters of the
security association, removing the security association and
installing a new one, or modification of the packet after it has gone
through IPsec processing. The only requirement is that after
registering a new binding at the home agent, the next IPsec packets
sent on this security association will be addressed to the new
care-of address.
We have chosen to require policy entries that are specific to a
tunnel interface. This means that implementations have to regard the
Home Agent - Mobile Node tunnel as a separate interface on which
IPsec SPDs can be based. A further complication of the IPsec
processing on a tunnel interface is that this requires access to the
BITS implementation before the packet actually goes out.
7.2. IKE
We have chosen to require that a dynamic key management protocol must
be able to make an authorization decision for IPsec security
association creation with different addresses than with what the key
management protocol is run. We expect this to be done typically by
configuring the allowed combinations of phase 1 user identities and
home addresses.
When certificate authentication is used, IKE fragmentation can be
encountered. This can occur when certificate chains are used, or
even with single certificates if they are large. Many firewalls do
not handle fragments properly, and may drop them. Routers in the
path may also discard fragments after the initial one, since they
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typically will not contain full IP headers that can be compared
against an access list. Where fragmentation occurs, the endpoints
will not always be able to establish a security association.
Fortunately, typical Mobile IPv6 deployment uses short certificate
chains, as the mobile node is communicating directly with its home
network. Where the problem appears, it may be difficult (at least
away from home) to replace the firewalls or routers with equipment
that can properly support fragments. It may help to store the peer
certificates locally, or to obtain them through other means.
7.3. Bump-in-the-Stack
Mobile IPv6 sets high requirements for a so-called Bump-In-The-Stack
(BITS) implementation model of IPsec. As Mobile IPv6 specific
modifications of the packets are required before or after IPsec
processing, the BITS implementation has to perform also some tasks
related to mobility. This may increase the complexity of the
implementation, even if it already performs some tasks of the IP
layer (such as fragmentation).
Specifically, Bump-in-the-Stack implementations may have to deal with
the following issues:
o Processing the Home Address destination option and Routing header
type 2 to a form suitable for IPsec processing to take place.
This is needed, among other things, for the security association
and policy lookups. While relatively straightforward, the
required processing may have a hardware effect in BITS
implementations, if they use hardware support beyond the
cryptographic operations.
o Detecting packets sent between the mobile node and its home agent
using IPv6 encapsulation.
o Offering the necessary APIs for updating the IPsec and IKE
security association endpoints.
8. IANA Considerations
No IANA actions are necessary based on this document. IANA actions
for the Mobile IPv6 protocol itself have been covered in [7].
9. Security Considerations
The Mobile IPv6 base specification [7] requires strong security
between the mobile node and the home agent. This memo discusses how
that security can be arranged in practice, using IPsec. The security
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RFC 3776 Home Agent IPsec June 2004
considerations related to this are documented in the base
specification, including a discussion of the implications of using
either manual or dynamic keying.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[3] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[4] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998.
[5] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[6] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6
Specification", RFC 2473, December 1998.
[7] Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
10.2. Informative References
[8] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402,
November 1998.
[9] Deering, S., Fenner, W. and B. Haberman, "Multicast Listener
Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October 1999.
[10] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C. and
M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
(DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[11] Vida, R. and L. Costa, Eds., "Multicast Listener Discovery
Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004.
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11. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Greg O'Shea, Michael Thomas, Kevin
Miles, Cheryl Madson, Bernard Aboba, Erik Nordmark, Gabriel
Montenegro, Steven Kent, and Santeri Paavolainen for interesting
discussions in this problem space.
12. Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
02420 Jorvas
Finland
EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com
Vijay Devarapalli
Nokia Research Center
313 Fairchild Drive
Mountain View CA 94043
USA
EMail: vijayd@iprg.nokia.com
Francis Dupont
ENST Bretagne
Campus de Rennes
2, rue de la Chataigneraie
CS 17607
35576 Cesson-Sevigne Cedex
France
EMail: Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr
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13. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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Acknowledgement
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